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IN THE SUPREME COURT
ofthe
NuV 20 -~-··STATE OF UTAH

FIL.ED

L. BrRT BIGLER and HERBERT
K. SLOANE,
Plaintiffs,
-vs.RAY P. GREENWOOD, GEORGE W.
MORGAN and LAWRENCE A.
JONES, as Commissioners of Salt
Lake County, and as Directors of
the Salt Lake City Suburban Sewer Case No. 7915
District,
Defendants,
and
SALT LAKE COUNTY SUBURBAN
IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION,
INC., a corporation,
Involuntary Party Plaintiff.
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IN THE· SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
L. BrRT BIGLER and HERBERT
K. SLOAXE,
Plaintiffs,
-vs.R~\.Y

P. GREENWOOD, GEORGE W.
MORGAN and LAWRENCE A.
JOXES, as Commissioners of Salt
Lake . County, and as Directors of
the .Salt Lake City Suburban Sew~r Case No. 7915
District,
Defendants,
and

~ALT

LAKE COUNTY SUBURBAN
LJIPROYEJIENT ASSOCIATION,
IXC., a corporation,

Involuntary Party Plaintiff.
BRIEF OF JXYOLrNTARY PARTY PLAINTIFF
STATEMENT
The Salt Lake County Suburban Improvement Association, Inc. was joined as an involuntary party plaintiff,
by the plaintiff in this case.
The Association elected to file ·a separate petition
and brief in this cause in order that the position of thousands of the residents affected by the sewer project
would be before the court. It will be our contention that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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not only was the act under which the Commission proceeded unconstitutional, and that the acts of the Commission thereunder were arbitrary, capricious and illegal
but that, in addition thereto, the legislature of this State
has enacted legislation de~igned specifically for the creation and financing of projects of the magnitude and
character involved in this case.
It is our earnest belief that a sewer project in the
area concerned should be constructed at the earliest
possible date. It is the Association's conviction, however, that the need for a sewer is not so great that constitutional rights should be sacrificed and that an illconceived, patch work, method of financing under an outmod~d act should be adopted. We have endeavored to
raise and discuss every issue bearing on this question
so that this Court may render a decision that will aid
all interested parties and permit additional legislation
to be introduced at the 1953 session, if needed.
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS
Apparently there is no dispute between the parties
as to questions of fact. The parties do disagree, we believe, as to the relevance and legality of certain ordinances, resolutions, and contracts. Because the record
consists only of ordinances, resolutions, protests, and a
stipulation, rather than a transcript, and because in the
course of the brief, reference will be made to certain of
these documents, we are outlining in chronological order
the steps followed by the defendants.

~~,;
~

q

,.

On May 18, 1942, the Board of Commissioners of
2
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Salt Lake County (hereinafter designated "Commission") adopted an ordinance regulating and controlling
all public or private sewers in the County. (Ex. A) Under the tenus of tllis ordinance, the owner of any improvenlent within ~00 feet of a n1ain or lateral sewer line
must connect up with the sewer line or be guilty of misdemeanor. A connection fee of $150.00 was imposed.
Under Section 17 of the ordinance, moneys paid for connection fees or otherwise on said sewer system was to be
placed in a general fund and the expenses of maintenance
and operation were to be paid by the County out of the
general fund.
On illay 16, 1951, this ordinance was amended by
providing that in lieu of the $150.00 connection fee, the
connection fee of $100.00 per connection would be charged if applied for by an owner of ten or more residences.
(Ex. N)
On September 9, 1946, the Commission adopted a
resolution that it enter an order creating the special improvement district and designated the boundaries thereof.
(Ex. B) The order was entered on the same date and .
the district was created under the authority of Title 19
Chapter 6A U.C.A. 1943. (Ex. C)
On January 20, 1947, the Commission accepted an
offer to purchase $2,750,000.00 (or such le·sser amount
as recommended by the engineer) of revenue bonds of
the Board of County Commissioners. (Ex. D) Under
the terms of the contract, sufficient number of signed
service applications accompanied by deposits of $50.00
per application would have to be secured, together with a

3
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requirement of an additional connection charge of $99.00
in cash of $120.00 in deferred payments as to applications
filed prior to letting of the construction contract; thereafter connection charge was to be $140.00 in cash; the
maximum intere·st cost was not to exceed 31;4% ; it was
estimated that it would be possrble to retire the bonds in
about 11 years; the minimum charge was to be $2.00 per
month.
On March 18, 1947, a Resolution (Ex. U) was adopted formally creating the district in order to provide for
the installation of a complete system and plant within
the boundaries of the district. Section 4 (Pg. 4, Ex. U)
of said resolution provides in part as follows:
"*** It is contemplated that the charges to be
made to the users of the system will constitute
liens against the property in said district enforceable in the event of a default in the payment of
such charges, based either upon the service application agree1nents to be signed by the owner
of said property or otherwise."
The resolution was, therefore, orde~ed to be filed
for recording to give notice of such lien. Thereafter, an
ordinance was adopted making it unlawful to construct,
or for the owner or any other person to occupy any property for residential, commercial, or industrial use within
200 feet of any street, etc., in which 'a public sewer is then
in existence and making it further unlawful for any
owner not to connect with the public sewer to be built
after notice is given that the public sewer is to receive
connections. A violator of this ordinance is guilty of
misdemeanor punishable with a fine not excee·ding $299.-

'

·~
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OO·or by an imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or·by
both fine and imprisonment. (Pg. 9, Ex. U)

N" ext on the same date the Commission adopted what
might be ter1ned the bond resolution. The title of this
resolution reads as follows:
.. A resolution providing for the acquisition of
a sanitary sewer systen1 and treatment and disposal plant for the use of the inhabitants of the
area in Salt Lak:e County known as 'Salt Lake
Suburban Sanitary District' : providing for the
issuance of the bonds of Salt Lake County' payable
frmn the revenue to be derived from the operation
of said sewer systen1: entering into certain agreelnents and making certain provisions for th~ security and pay1nent of su.ch bond.s·::confir:rnlli.g the
sale and provide for the delivery of such bonds
and entering into collateral agreements and provisions in coimection with the foregoing."
The resolution in addition to ·adopting the promsions required in the agreement with the fiscal agents and
purchaser of the bonds provided for the following:
The cost of the portion of the system to be initially
constructed, including all incidental expenses, was estimated to be not in excess of $2,750,000.00 (page 11). The
guaranty fund should never exceed 10% of the principal
amount. The original bond issue was to be $1,400~000.00
becoming due $50,.000.00 .each year for 28 years. The
~chedule of rates, initial service charge, and additional
payments is set forth on Page 29. The ordinance providing for the. discontinuance of privy vaults, septic tanks,
and cesspools and for connecting to public sewers, supra,
was to be maintained in force by the County; The Gom-

5
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mission was to require any owner delinquent for
more than six months in the payment of the charges to
cease to dispose all waste from his premises, and in
order to enforce this provision, the Commission was to
give notice to any public or private board supplying
water to or selling water to the premise to cease supplying water, and if any public or private corporation did
not cease supplying water to the premises the Commission
shall be entitled to enter upon such premises and it shall
through an agent of employe, shut off the supply water o.f
such premises ; the bonds were to be sold to Lauren W.
Gibbs at set price as will result in an interest cost not in
excess of 31,4 o/o per annum.
On April 2, 1947, resolution (Ex. E) was adopted
appointing Caldwell, Richards, and Sorenson, as Consulting Engineers, and Koebig and Koebig as Associates
on the design and construction of the project.
On May 16, 1947, a resolution was adopted appointing C. Earl Alsop, L. Burt Bigler, and Horace A. Sorenson as members of the Advisory Committee. (Ex. G)
On June 30, 1947, a resolution was adopted (Ex. H)
providing that in the event that it is determined that the
sewer was not to be constructed under the resolution and
ordinance theretofore adopted, and that the project be
abandoned, Trustee was to return all payments made by
the owners.
On September 29, 1947 the Commission resolved to
increase to $3,250,000.00 the maximum amount of bonds
which may be required to be purchased by the Fiscal
Agent.
6
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On January 9, 1948, (Ex. J) Commission by resolution accepted and agreed to the proposal of the purchasing, fiscal agent to extend the time for the delivery
of the bonds, pro,iding that the interest cost be increased
frmn 3.~3<;;(, to 3.72jc.
On February 16, 19-±S (Ex. I() according to the minutes of Conunission, the Commission questioned whether
it was feasible to proceed with the project.
On ~\.pril5, 1948, at a 1neeting attended by the Board
of Commissioners, the County Attorney, Mr. Edward M.
~Iorrissey and his Chief Deputy, Elliot W. Evans, a
resolution was submitted by ilir. Evans which was thereafter adopted by the Commission. (Ex. L) The Commission in its preamble stated, "All bids for the construction
of said sewer system has been rejected as being e.xcessive and numerous objections to the construction of the
proposed sewer systen1 at this time and under the proposed method of finance thereof have been m·ade to and
received by the Board of County Commissioners and
the Board of County Commissioners deem in (sic) inadvisable under present conditions to proceed with the
construction of the sewer system in said Salt Lake
County Suburban Sanitary District." and further, "many
of said prospective users who have made payment of
said initial payments are now requesting and demand
the return of said initial payment." Thereupon it duly resolved to abandon the proposed acquisition of sewer system as provided in the resolution of March 18, 1947 and
rescinded said resolution. The trustee was authorized and
directed to return all initial payments.

7
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Nothing further was. done. by the Commission in
regard to this project for the next four years except to
return to the fiscal agent a deposit of $20,000.00.
On March 7, 1952, a letter dated January 31, 1952
of Robert E. Schweser was accepted by reso~ution of
the Board of County Commissioners. (Ex. 0)
Under the terms of this contract, it was recognized
that the interest of Lauren W. Gibbs in a previous contract had been sold and assigned to Wacob-Bender Cor~
poration and Robert E. Schweser Company. Instead of
an outright sale, the assignees were to act as Fiscal
Agent and agreed: "5-Fo,r such Revenue Bonds as may
be issued to pay for the construction of the 0omplete
sewer facilities under the present district and which meet
the above requirements, we guarantee to find a buyer
at a price interest rate and maturity as approved as to
legality by the aforesaid bond attorneys and by the
engineer as to feasibility."
On March 10, 1952, (Ex. P), there was a recommendation that the Commission pass a resolution instructing
the Engineer to proceed with a· study of new construction in the district for the purpose of bringing the original plans up to date. Estimates of construction costs
were to be prepared together with final plans and specifications.
On June 30, 1952, First Security Bank of Utah was
appointed depository. (Ex. Q)
The minutes of August 25, 1952-(Ex. R) summarize
the hearing held on the protest of Harrison Brothers. As
is indicated "The financing of the proposed sewer was

8
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discussed.n The Chairman stated "all sound suggestions
would be considered and incorporated into the plan
wherever possible."
On Septen1ber 12, 1952, (Ex. T), the Commission approved the letter addressed to the Engineer which directed then1 to proceed at once to advertise for bids for
the construction of the County Sewer. The advertising·
was to start not later than September 19, so that the bids
could be opened on October 20, 1952.
On October 6, 1952, (Ex. Y) a resolution was passed
repealing the resolution adopted on April 5, 1948, rescinding certain proceedings pertaining to Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary District. The resolution reads as follows:
"NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved by the
Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake
County, Utah, that said resolution of April 5,
1948 purporting to rescind the proceedings theretofore adopted as set forth in the preamble heretofore is hereby declared to have been adopted by
mistake and is hereby expressly repealed, rescinded, and held for naught and said proceedings
of ~larch 18, 194:7 are hereby approved, ratified,
and declared to be now and to before since March
18, 1947 in full force and exact in all respects as
though said resolution of April 5, 1948 had never
· been adopted."
.On the same date a resolution (Ex. W) was adopted
amending the resolution of March 18, 1947. (Ex. U)
The material amendments will be discussed under
the applicable section of our argument.
Thereafter on the same date a further resolution

9
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(Ex. X) was adopted whose title is as follows :
"A resolution providing for the issuance of
$3,850,000 Salt Lake City Suburban Sewer Bonds
Series 1952, payable from the operation of a sani~
tary sewer system and treatment disposal plant in
and adjacent to Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary District; entering into certain agreements and making certain provisions for the security and payment of such honds and providing for the sale and
delivery thereof."
The material sections of this resolution will also be
discussed under the applicable section of our argument.
It is assumed that all further action by the Commission has been stayed since the entry of this Court's
order on October 8, 1952.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1. THERE IS NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY
FOR THE COMMISSION'S ACTS.
POINT 2. THE STATUTES AND DEFENDANTS' PROCEEDINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
POINT 3. THE COMMISSION'S ACTS ARE ILLEGAL,
ARBITRARY, AND CAPRICIOUS.
POINT 4. THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED OCTOBER 6,
1952 ARE ILLEGAL, VOID, AND BEYOND THE POWER OF
THE COMMISSION.

.ARGUMENT
POINT 1. THERE IS NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY
FOR THE ACTS OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.

The proposed project and the proposed financing
are not within the express limitations contained in Title

10
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19, Chapter 6a, Section ~. Utah Code Annotated, 1943.

The literal or granunatical rneaning of the language
employed by the Legislature in Section 8 of Chapter 6a
of Title 19, lT.C.A .• 1943, leaYe~ little roon1 for speculation or debate concerning the legislative intent. In the
preceding seetion~ of Chapter 6a, supra, the Legislature
has described the projects and special improvement districts that boards of county comnrissioners rnay create
and operate and it has prescribed the methods by which
the cost of such projects or special improvements may be
provided. The methods of financing in such preceding
sections are expressly linrited to (i) the levying of assessments against the property benefited, or (ii) the imposing of fees, tolls, rents or other charges for the use of
the improvements, or (iii) both. No general authority
is conferred upon such boards to enter into any contracts
to provide funds with which to finance such projects or
special improvements or to pledge or hypothecate revenues in connection therewith. Then comes Section 8
which does confer a special or limited authority to borrow funds, to enter into contracts, to issue securities, and
to pledge or hypothecate revenues as security for repayment of borrowed funds. This authority is expressly
limited to matters "in connection" with the financing of
such of said projects and special improvements (those
previously described in Chapter 6a) "as may be approppriate and possible under the laws of the United States
relating thereto." The phrase "laws of the United
States" has only one meaning and that is "Acts of Congress." See cases cited in Words and Phrases, Perman11
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ent Edition,. Volume 24, . pages. 440-441,. and in 1952
pocke~ supplement the·reto, page 142. There can be no
question that the power conferred under Section 8, supra,
is limited 'by the plain language of the statute to the financing of such projects as may be appropriate and possible under Acts of the Congress of the United States.
It is only "in co'YIII'bection" with such projects that the
Board of County Commissioners -of any county is
authorized to enter into contracts with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation of the United States or with
any other private or public agency, person, corporation
or individual, for the purpose of providing funds with
which to finance a proposed project or special improvement. It is only "in connection" with the financing of
such projects and special improvements as may be appropriate and possible under Acts of the Congress of .the
United States that the Board of County Commissioners
of any county is authorized to issue securities and pledge .
or hypothecate revenues for the payment of the principal and interest thereof.
The question immediately arises, of course, whether
a literal construction ·of the language employed by the
Legislature in Section 8 is a reasonable construction, that
is, whether such literal construction is in harmony with
the general purposes of the statute, and whether there
were in existence at the time of its enactment any "laws
of the United States," (Acts of Congress), relating to
projects and special improvements of the type generally
authorized by the chapter and which might require the
borrowing -of funds and the pledging or hypothecation

12
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of revenues. It is submitted that there was in existence
at least one Art of CongTe~~, enacted, during the administration .of President Hoover, which related to the
financing of projects and special in1proven1ents of the
type conteinpla.ted by SectionS, supra. That was the "Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act and Emergency
Relief and Construction Act of 193:2," Title 15, U.S. Code,
Chapter 14, Section 605 (b), popularly referred to as the
"E1nergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932." (Note
July :21, 1932, C. 520, Section 201, 47 Stat. 711 et seq.)
Section 605(b), supra, provided in part as follows:
"Section 605(b). Same; additional loans authorized - (a) Self-liquidating projects; convict
labor
"The Reconstruction Finance Corporation is
authorized and empowered.
"(1) To make loans to, or contracts with,
States, municipalities, and political subdivisions
of states, public agencies of States, of municipalities, and of partial subdivjsions of States, public
corporations,. boards and commissions, and public
municipal instrumentalities of one or more States,
to aid in financing projects authorized under Federal, State or municipal law which are self-1iquidating in charac~er, such loans or contracts to
be made through the purchase of their s-ecurities,
or otherwise, and for such purpose the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is authorized to
bid for such securities.
* * *
"(6) * * *
"For the purposes of this subsection a project
shall be deemed to be self-liquidating if such
13
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,

project will be made self-supporting and financially solvent and if the construction cost thereof
will be returned within a reasonable period by
means of tolls, fees, rents or other charges, or by
such other means (other than by taxation) as
may be prescribed by the statutes which provide
for the project, * * *"
The foregoing provisions were construed in the case
of Public Market Company of Portland v. City of Portland (1942), 130 P. 2nd 624, 171 Or. 522, amplified on
rehearing, 138 P. 2nd 916, 171 Or. 522. The Oregon
Court, in the latter opinion, co~ented as follows:
"The Emergency Relief and Construction Act
of 1932 granted to it (the RFC) power to make
loans only to aid in financing projects, such as
a municipal market, 'which are self-liquidating
in character,' 15 U.'S.C.A. 605b (a) (3). By paragraph number ( 6) of that section the project 'shall
be deemed to be self-liquidating if such project
will be made self-supporting and financially solvent and if the construction cost thereof will be
returned within a reasonable period by means of
tolls, fees, rents, or other charges, or by such
other mearis (other than by taxation) as may be
prescribed by the statutes which provide for the
project * * :;:,, Although the statute does not preclude the corporation from taking the additional
security of a general mbicipal obligation, if the
project is otherwise eligible as a self-liquidating
one (see Circular No. 3 of the RFC, Information
for Prospective Applicants for Loans for 'SelfLiquidating' Projects under the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, February,
1933) still it is o'bvious that the purpose of the
act ~as to relieve unemployment by financing
self-liquidating projects during a period of de14
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pression when, a8 we judicially know, municipal
corporations and other public bodies were hard
put to find ta..."\: money8 sufficient to meet even the
ordinary expense8 of governinent."
Section 605 (b), supra, was repeated by Act June 30,
19±7, C. 166, Title II 206 (a) (e), G1 Stat. 208.
~\ mere reading of Section· 8 of Chapter 6a, supra,
with its reference to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to "self-liquidating projects," etc., together with
Section 605 (b) of the Emergency Relief and Construc-tion Act of 193:2, supra, can lead to no other conclusion
than that the "Gtah Legislature intended by Section 8 to
enable boards of county commissioners to take advantage
of the opportunity to obtain loan funds from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation or similar Federal
lending and that the powers conferred were carefully
limited to those necessary for the accomplishment of that
purpose and that purpose alone.

If anything further is required to convince the Court
that Section 8 of Chapter 6a, supra, was intended by the
Legislature to apply only to such projects and special
improvements as might be financed under laws of the
r nited States relating thereto, a review of the legislative
history of the enactment of Chapter 6a, supra, and particularly of Section 8 thereof, as revealed by House
Journal, Special and 20th Sessions of the Legislature
of the State of Utah, 1933, should suffice. The measure
was introduced in the Utah Legislature on February 13,
1933, as House Bill101. As originally introduced, House
Bill 101 did not contain the provisions which appear in
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Section 8 · nor was there any reference te the subject
·matter of Section 8 in the title of the bill as originally
introduced. On the day of introduction it was read the
first time and referred to the Committee on Irrigation,
which committee, after consideration of the measure
reported it favorably on February 25, 1933, with amend-'
ments. One of the amendments added the words in the
title of the bill after the word "both" and added at the
end of the bill the present Section 8 of Chapter 6a, supra.
It will be noted from the comment of the Oregon Court
in Public Market Company of Portland v. City of Portland, supra, quoted above, that reference was made therein to circular No. 3 of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, entitled "Information for Prospective Applicants for Loans for 'Self-liquidating Projects under the
Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932," and
that such circular was issued in February of 1933. Even
though the legislative history of the act under consideration is not complete, there being no report of the proceedings of the Committee on Irrigation or of the reasons
which prompted the addition of the present Section 8
or of debate on the measure, it may reasonably be assumed that the addition of the enabling provision was
prompted by the receipt, in February of 1933 and after
the introduction of the bill, of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation's Circular No. 3, refeTred to above, or of
other publicity concerning the availability of loans to
counties and other State political subdivisions under the
provisions of the Emergency Relief and Construction
Act of 1932.
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It is clear fron1 the foregoing that Section H of
Chapler t)a. supra, conferred no authority whatsoever
upon any board of county ('onunissioners to enter into
any contraets or to issue any seeurities or to hypothecate or pledge any reYennes, other than "in connection"
with projects or special in1prove1nents for which financing n1ight be obtained through one of the authorized
agencies of the Federal government, particularly the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The authorization
provided therein for the entering into contracts with
. "any other priYa te or public agency, person, corporation,
or individual," clearly is restricted to such contracts as
might be necessary to the creation and operation of proj- .
ects and special improvements "appropriate and possible
under the laws of the L nited States relating thereto."
It is common knowledge, of course, that Federal aid in
the form of financing through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, or similar agencies, is seldom 100%
financing but usually involves the financing of a part
of the cost by the borrower through other means. Moreover, it will be noted from the provisions of Section 605
(b) of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of
1932, supra, that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was authorized thereby to make loans or contracts
to aid in financing local projects through the purchase
of the securities of the political subdivision and was
authorized to bid for such securities. This, of course,
envisione~ · something other than direct loans and would
entail the purchase of securities which involved contracts between the borrower and other persons, corpo-
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rations, or individuals. The fact is inescapable, however,
that the authorization contained in Section 8 of Chapter
6a, supra, for the entering into contracts with any other
person, corporation, or individual, was expressly limited
to such contracts as were "in connection" with such
projects and special improvements as were "appropriate
and possible under the laws of the United States relating thereto."
It should be here noted that the special and limited
character of the authorization contained in Section 8,
supra, furnishes the only plausible explanation of the
failure of the legislature to make provision therein for
the normal safeguards of the public interest, such as
publication of notice, opportunity for protest, election on
issuance of bonds, etc., which are contained in acts providing for the acquisition of improvements by special
improvement districts and the issuance of bonds in payment therefor. Section 8, supra, contemplated nothing
more than the obtaining of such Federal assistance as
might be available, and it carefully restricted the authority granted to that which was necessary to enable bo:ards
of county commissioners to obtain such assistance. The
Court may take judicial notice of the fact that this legislation came in the very depth of the economic depression
that swept the country in the early thirties; that like the
Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, supra,
which it complemented, its primary purpose was to
relieve unemployment by financing self-liquidating projects during a period when local governmental units could
scarcely meet their ordinary expenses of government,
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and when the Federal govern1nen t was virtually the only
souree of financial aid for public. works. Aid and reHef
were needed with a n1ini.J.nun1 of delay, and the ordinary
safeguards had to be foregone to enable municipalities
to obtain the assistanee pr01nptly. But it is inconceivable
that the legislature intended that such safeguards should
be waived for all purposes and for all tune. Indeed, when
the Roosevelt Adnrinistra.tion can1e into power and proceeded to enact other relief legislation providing for
grants in aid and loans to States and political subdivision of states, the l'tah legislature met in special
session and provided further implemental legislation
to enable counties, cities, towns, and any improvement
districts · to obtain financial aid from Federal sources,
particularly under the so-called National Industrial Recovery Act and from the Federal E1nergency Administration of Public \V orks. See Laws of Utah, 1933, Second
Special Session, Chapter 22, effective August 8, 1933,
Title 76A, Chapter 2, Section 1, et seq., and Laws 1933,
Second Special Session, Chapter 23, effective July 26,
1933, Title 76A, Chapter 2, Section 24, et seq., These enactments were more comprehensive than Title 19, Chapter 6a, Section 8, supra, and supplemented the earlier
provision which may be said to have had only a brief period of act~al applicability since it was directed to the
obtaining of relief under the Emergency :Relief and Construction Act of 1932, supra, the functions of which
were superseded by those provided under the National
Industrial Recovery Act and similar enactments of the
new national administration which came into power in
~[arch of 1933.
19
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.. IF. TITLE 19, .QltAPTER -Sa, SECTION 8,. UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1943,. AS AMENDED,. WAS INTENDED BY
THE 1933 LEGISLATURE TO APPLY TO SEWER PROJECTS, AND FINANCING, OF THE TYPE HERE IN CONTROVERSY, THEN SUCH SECTION MUST BE HELD TO
HAVE BEEN REPEALED BY IMPLICATION BY SUBSEQUENT ENACTMENTS OF THE UTAH LEGISLATURE
DEALING COMPREHENSIVELY WITH THE SAME SUBJECT MATTER.

If it is conceded, arguendo,. that Section 8, supra,
does authorize conventional revenue bond financing in
connection with sewer projects such -as that contemplated
by the proposal here in controversy, it is submitted that
such statutory authority has been superseded by subsequent enactments of the Utah legislature and must be
considered to have_ been repealed by implication to the
extent that it had application to the financing of the acquisition, construction, etc., of sewer systems.
The first subsequent legislation to be considered
is Chapter 25, Laws of Utah, 1947, Title 19, Chapter
5a, Sections 1 to 23, inclusive, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, as amended, which was repealed by Chapter 24,
Laws of Utah, 1949, Title 19, Chapter 5a, Sections 24 to
40, inclusive. A review of the title to this measure is
sufficient to reveal that it was an attempt to deal comprehensively with the important matter of the creation
and ope·ration of "sewerage improvement districts" and
the financing of the acquisition and construction of
sewage facilities. This enactment, it will be noted, did
attempt to provide the safeguards of the public interest,
that is, the due process provisions for notice, public hearing, bond elections, etc., which are normally contained

20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in such statutes. Apparently, however, the provisions
were deemed inadequate, beeause the 1949 legislature expressly repealed then1 and enacted in their stead an
even n1ore con1prehensiYe statute with greater attention
to constitutional rights and denwcratic procedures. Then
in El51, by Chapter :2-!, Laws of the State of Utah, 1951,
the 1949 enactment was further an1ended and improved,
with even greater en1phasis upon protection of the property owners' rights.
It is submitted that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the provisions of Section 8, Chapter 6a,
Title 19, supra, and those parts of the subsequent enactments hereinbefore cited, which relate to the financing
of the construction and acquisition of sewer and sewage
facilities. It cannot reasonably be concluded that the
Utah legislature would have, in the subsequent enactments, dealt so carefully and comprehensively with the
subject and striven so conscientiously to afford the necessary protection to the public interest, if it had at the
same time intended to leave in operative existence an
earlier provision dealing with the same subject which is
so totally lacking in comprehensiveness and in desirable
safeguards. The purpose of the later legislation certainly
could be circumvented and defeated if there remained in
existence a provision so general, so brief, and so defi.cient in the ordinary provisions for due process, to be
availed of by a board of county commissioners which,
for one reason or another, should find the provisions of
the later enactment too burdensome, or otherwise unsuited to its purposes and objectives.
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While it is true that this Court, like others, has in the
past shown a proper reluctance to find a repeal by implication of an Act of the Utah Legislature, it should not
hesitate to reach such a· result when the earlier act and
the later enactments on the same subject cannot by any
reasonable construction be harmonized and given coterminous operative e·ffect. This is particularly true in a
case such as this where the public interest would be so
vitally and adversely affected by a decision that the
earlier act remains in operative existence and available
as an atternative to the later and more comprehensive
and satisfactory enactments.
The rule that is applicable here is well stated, with
extensive citation of authority, in Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, 3rd Edition, Horack, Volume 1, Section
2018, as follows:
"The intent to repeal all former laws upon
the subject is made apparent by the enactment
of subsequent comprehensive legislation establishing elaborate inclusions and exclusions of the persons, things and relationships ordinarily associated with the subject. Legislation of this sort
which operates to revise the entire subject to
which it relates, by its very comprehensiveness
gives strong implication of a legislative intent
* * * to repeal former statutory law upon the
subject * * *."
Thus it is seen that a complete revision of the subject
matter of a statute reverses the ordinary presumption
against an implied repeal. We have that here. We have
also irreconcilable conflict and repugnancy if it is as22
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sumed that the 1933 Statute was applicable to the type
of financing here in controversy.
The Court should hold either (i) that Section 8,
Chapter 6a, Title 19, is inapplicable to projects and the
type of financing here in controversy or (ii) that, if applicable, such provision was repealed by the subsequent
enactment of con1prehensive legislation on the subject.
POINT 2. THE STATUTES AND DEFENDANT'S PROCEEDINGS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Title 19, Chapter 6 is unconstitutional and void in
that it is contrary and repugnant to Article I, Section
2, Article I, Section 7 and Articles VI, Section 29, Constitution of Utah.
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:
"All political power is inherent in the people;
and all free governments are founded on their
authority for their equal protection and benefit,
and they have the right to alter or reform their
government as the public welfare may require."
Article VI, Section 29 of the Constitution provides:
"The Legislation shall not delegate to any
special commission, private corporation or asso~
ciation, any powe-r to Inake, supervise or interfere with any n1unicipal improvement, money,
property or effects, whether held in trust or
otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a capitol site,
or to perform any municipal functions."
If a sewer district organized under Title 19, Chapter
6a, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, is an "arm of the government" not subject to the constitutional and statutory
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debt limi~ti9n~, as '}las been held in th~ c~s~ of Tygeson
v. Magna Water Company, 116 Utah "-----, 226 Pac. 2nd
127, then the Court should hol<:I that the Salt L~e City
Suburban Sewer District is unconstitutional in that
'
under Section 8 :
(a) It is special commission assuming, supervising, or interfering with municipal functions
in violation of Article VI, Section 29 and
Article I, Section 2, Constitution of Utah.
(b) By vesting supervisory and control power in
the County Commission, the residents o.f the
district are deprived of their political powers
and the right to reform or alter the district,
or remove the controlling officers, as the welfare of the district or the system may require
in violation of Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution.
(c) That Section 8, Title 19, Chapter 6a is unconstitutional and void in that it is contrary and
repugnant to the 5th Amendment of the
Constitution of the United 'States and to Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah, in that
it deprives the residents and property owners
in said district of their liberty and property
without due process of law.

In the Tygesen case, supra, this Court in holding
that a "district" created under Chapter 24, Laws of Utah,
1949, was not a "speci~ commission" did so upon the
grounds that once the County Commission had initiated
the district, the commission function ceased, and the district board functioned autonomously from the Commission and hence was an "arm of go:vernment."
At page 130, of 226 Pac. 2nd, the Court said:
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'Assuming, without conceding, that the term
'municipal functions' as used in Art. VI, Sec~ 29,
applied to the functions of counties as well as
cities and towns, nevertheless, plaintiff's contention is not tenable. The 1nanagen1ent and control
of the Intprovmnent Districts and its properties
and effects are lw the Act vested in a Board of
Trustees even th~ug·h these districts are initiated
by the county connnission. Their operations will
be separate and distinct from any of the functions assumed by the eounties in those unincorporated cities or towns. Although these operations ntight be in the same territorial boundaries
as the improventent districts, they will have no
control ·over the property or effects of the counties
or of the manner of the performance of any of the
functions which the counties have assumed. These
·improvement districts are similar to the Metropolitan \Vater Districts and the Water Conservancy Districts. In the :Metropolitan Water District ~\ct the initiating agencies were the legislative bodies of the cities desiring the districts,
in the vVater Conservancy Act the district courts
upon petition of a specified percentage of property owners were the agencies through which the
districts could be established, whereas in the
In1provement District Act under consideration the
Legislature has seen fit to give· the duty to the
county commissioners of the counties in which
it is desired to establish a district. In all of these
acts once the initiating agencies have acted and a
district has been formed their functions cease and
the governing body of the district assumes full
control of the district and its properties. This
court has held that the Metropolitan Water Districts and the Water Conservancy Districts organized under those Acts were separate and dis25
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,

tinct arms of the government and not special commissions, boards, private corporations or associations within the purview of the constitutional
prohibition. See Lehi City v. Meiling, City Recorder, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530 and Patterick
v. Carbon Water Conservancy District, 106 Utah
55, 145 P. 2d 503. The fact that proceedings to
initiate an Improvement District is left to the
county commissioners of the counties in which the
Districts can be formed might lend some support
to an argument that a district would not be a
separate and distinct arm of the government but
Inerely be an arm of a county for the purpose of
carrying out a county function, we·re it not for
the fact that once the District is actually organized the county has no further connection with the
District except the ministerial one of levying any
taxes certified to it by the Board of Trustees, a
duty of the county which is similar. to that performed by it for Boards of Education under the
provisions of Sec.. 75-12-10, U.C.A. 1943. Once
the District is formed the Board of Trustees have
full control and supervision of tP,e property and
the conduct of affairs of the District. The District
must have its own seal and its Board of Trustees
may sue and be sued. ·Also the taxes which are
certified by the Board to the county commissioners can be levied only on property within the District. If a District were merely an arm of the
county then the general taxes levied whethe-r used
for benefits inuring to the District or not should
be levied against all residents of the county rather
than on those only within the District, just as soon
as they are for other county functions. It being
the duty of this court where possible to uphold
the validity of an act rather than declare it unconstitutional, see Lehi City v. Meiling, City Re26
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

corder, supra, and Patteriek Y. Carbon Water
Con~ern1ney District, supra, we are of the opinion that an Improve1uen t District is a separate
arin of the govenunent and not a mere adjunct
of a county perfonning eounty functions."
In the case at bar the Comn1ission not only establishes the district, but thereafter has complete control
over it. It alters, n1anages en1ployees and other officers
and exercises supervisory powers. It determines rates
and charges. It detern1ines who shall connect up and
what fee, charge or penalty shall be imposed.
In Lehi City v. :Jleiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 Pac. 2nd
530, the Court held the Metropolitan Water District Act
did not create a "special commission" even though the
members of the Board were appointed by the government authorities, since the electors of the district voted
on the establishment of that type of selection of its board
members.
Under Title 19, Chapter 6, Section 8, the electors
have no say regarding the establishment o.f the district,
nor in the selection of officers.
The Commission is elected by and responsible to the
people of the whole county. They are not elected by, nor
are they responsible to, the voters of the district only.
Thus the pow-er to create the district and the power to
control, operate and manage the system is vested in a
board not responsible or accountable to the people ...
and the only people . . . who are concerned with fees,
costs, financing, operation and control.
At page 548, of 48 Pac. 2nd, Justice Wolfe, in his
concurring opinion in· the Meiling case said :
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'~The Legislature has not set up an entity and
directly given it powers. It has permitted the
people of the various cities and towns which are
to be included in the territorial limits of the entity
to set up such an entity which when and if they
do, 1nay exercise certain powers. If the people
choose not set it up, no power comes into being.
The people, themselves, in the last analysis, have
control of the situation."

Sections 2 to 6 of Chapter 6a of Title 19, provide
for an exercise of power, a voice by the people,
and might possibly meet the rules laid down in
the Tygeson and Melling cases. In the case at bar, however, the commission chose to ignore these provisions
and are proceeding solely under the authority of Sections 1 and 8. Sections 1 and 8 of the Act give the residents of the district no voice in its creation, size, obligation to be inc11:rred, sharing of the burden, method of
payment, operation or control, but leaves all these fundamental and basic rights to a commission not subject to
selection, control or removal by residents of the district.
We submit this constitutes a "special commission" within
the inhibition of Article VI, Section 29 and deprives the
residents of the district of the rights guaranteed by Arti- ,
cle I, Section 2.
As heretofore stated, the Commission is acting solely
under the provisions of Section 1 and 'Section 8 of Chapter 6a, Title 19.
Section 1 provides that a district may be created by
the commission upon a petition by "10% of the people."
Who constitutes 10% of the people, whether they include
28
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men, women or children is not- known. · Whether they
must reside in the district or may reside outside the district in the county, or may reside anywhere in the state
or whether they need be property owners in either the
district, county or state is not known.
Section S provides for the borrowing of funds and
the issuance of revenue bonds.
In neither Section are the following procedures
provided:
(a) No provision is made for a hearing on the
creation of the district.
(b) No procedure is provided for protesting the
establishment of the district.
(c) :N 0 procedure is provided for a property
owner to protest having his property included in the district confines, if said property
will not be directly benefited by the proposed
improvement.
(d) No provision is made for the filing and hearing of protests in connection with the issuance of bonds.
(e) No election procedure is provided nor is any
right given to vote whether bonds should
be issued.
(f) No provision is made for hearings in regard
to the imposition of charges and regulations
of rates.
Due process of law requires the above rights in the
creation and financing of public improvements.
In Argyle v. Johnson, 39 Utah 500, 118 Pac. 487, relating to drainage districts, the Court at page 490 of 118
Pac. said:
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"In giving legal effect to the foregoing principle in cases like the one at bar, it is not neeessary that a hearing be had at any particular
stage of the proceedings by which rights may be
effected or that the hearing be had before a regularly constituted court of justice; but it is necessary that a hearing be given at some time and
that the same be had before some officer tribunal
' prop-'
board, or court to whom the person whose
erty is affected may present his evidence, objections and arguments, to the end that the officer,
tribunal, board or court may be enabled to fairly
and intelligently pass upon and determine the
questions presented for decision."
And commenting upon the Argyle case the court in Lundberg v. Irrigation District, 40 Utah 83, 119 Pac. 1039,
stated:
"It was because the drainage law failed to
give the landowner an opportunity to be heard before a proper tribunal who had power to hear
any objection he might have against having. his
lands included within the proposed district, that
impelled us to hold the drainage law invalid upon the ground that the landowner's property may
be taken without due process of law."
In Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District,
106 Utah 55, 145 Pac. 2nd 503, the Court speaking
through Justice Wade, held the statutory provisions of
Section 100-11-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which provided for a filing of the petition protesting the creation
of the district satisfied the due process provisions of the
constitution. At page 508 Justice Wade states:
"Section.100-11-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943
above quoted, provides for the filing of a petition
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protesting the er~ation of the district and for the
dis1nissal of the original petition in case it is
signed by the requi~ite nlunber of landowners of
the required value.. rrhat Section also provides
that any landowner within the district 1nay contraYert the facts alleged in the original petition and
in case the court finds that the facts proved are
not sufficient lmder the statute to justify the creation of the district that the original petition shall
be denied."
Justice \Yolfe in his concurring opinion stated at
page 51-! of 1-!5 Pac.:
··It becomes evident that due process requires
only that each landowner be given notice and a
hearing before his lands are included within the
boundaries of the district and before they are assessed for making the proposed improvement. He
has no constitutional right to require a vote to
det~rmine whether the majority want such an improvement constructed. This latter is purely a
question of legislative policy. A district could
· be organized without notice or hearing so long
as each landowner was given a hearing on the
question of \vhether his lands have been benefited
and should ·be assessed to pay for the said improvement."
"While, as a hove indicated, due process does
not require that affected landowners be given a
chance to vote on the desirability of the constructing of the proposed improvement, it certainly is
consistent with our principles of government to
follow such a procedure. Thus before organizing
conservancy districts and making other improvements which will be paid for by ass~ssing the
lands benefited, it is not surprising that legislatures often provide a procedure by which the
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· A:ffec~ed land owners can voice their disapproval,
and 1f the objectors are sufficient in number, defeat the construction of the proposed improvement."
And in reygesen v. Magna Water Company, supra, at
page 132 and 133, of 226 Pac. 2nd, the court upheld Chapter :M, Laws of Utah, 1949, as against the contention
that it violated the due process clause of the Constitution
because the 0ourt found that ample opportunity was
given to file objections and protests and have a hearing
on said objections and protests before the property of the
protestants could be included in the district for assessment purposes.
Neither 'Section 1 nor Section 8 of Title 19, Chapter
6a provides for any hearing, any protest or any determination of benefits to property before the obligation to pay
is placed upon the property owner. And it is heretofore pointed out these are the only Sections of the Act
under which the respondents have attempted to proceed
in the case at bar.
THE ACTS OF THE COMMISSION IN PURPORTING
TO ACQUIRE, CONSTRUCT AND FINANCE SEWER SYSTEM WERE ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND ILLEGAL
AND DENIED THE RESIDENTS OF THE DISTRICT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.

Respondents may argue that due process under the
"special fund" doctrine does not require adherence to
procedures outlined in the next preceding argument since
no-one is deprived of any right under a revenue bond
financing scheme. However, it is our position that due
process of law requires adherence to fundamental due·
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process ·whenever action is taken by a .public body ...While
respondents have titled, called and represented the present plan as a revenue bond plan we contend that they
have proceeded to adopt direetly and indirectly the compulsory features incident to assessn1ent financing and
have so far departed fron1 the limitations of the "special
fund" doctrine that the present plan in effect is not under
the "special fund" doctrine.
This Court has had occasion to construe the "special
fund" doctrine in several cases :
Barnes v. Lehi City, 7-! Utah 321, 279 Pac.

S7S;
Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 144, .28:
Pa.c. 2nd 144;
·
Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321,
28 Pac. 2nd 161 ;
rtah Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, 94
l' tah 203, 74 Pac. 2nd 1191 ;
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Ogden City, 95
"Gtah 161, 79 Pac. 2nd 61.
In the above cited cases this Court has approved,
with limitations, the "special fund" doctrine.
The "special fund" doctrine permits the financing of
projects regardless of the statutory debt limitations,
provided, the payment of the obligation incurred is made
solely from the revenues earned by the project. FU.nds
owned by an existing municipal utility may not be used
to pay the obligations incurred in constructing an additional utility free from the debt limitations, Fjelstead
v. Ogden City, supra. Nor may a governing body of a
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municipality or company pledge tax funds for payment
of " speC!'al f und" revenue bonds. Cases supra.
Nor can such governing body do indirectly what it is
prohibited from doing directly. In Utah Power & Light
Co. v. Provo City, it is stated at page 1207-1208 of 74 Pac.

2nd:
. '''l'hese bonds, being by their terms and by the
ord1nance authorizing their issuance, strictly revenue bonds, to be paid only from the revenues received fron1 the sale of electrical power from the
plant to be erected, may not, directly or indirectly,
be a charge on, or paid from revenues derived
from, taxation. 'l'his is the gist, the crux, and the
basis of the special fund doctrine. Any other construction would make them a 'debt' within the
constitutional inhibition, and void the whole issue.
And since the city is, by the Constitution, prohibited from incurring debts beyond the specified
limit, they cannot by subterfuge or indirection do
that which they could· not do openly and directly.
'fhe debt inhibition was written into the Constitution to protect the citizens from, and assure
them that there would be no excessive tax burden
imposed upon then1. This because the duty of,
and necessity for, payment of a tax is not optional
or contractual, but a burden imposed not with the
consent, but often against the will, of the taxpayer. There is the further reason that a tax
becomes a lien upon the property of the taxpayer
and may be a means of divesting hi1n of his property. By its express terms the Constitution makes
the limitations and inhibitions on the taxing
power mandatory and prohibitory. Article 1, S.
26. If these provisions of the ordinance quoted
above were construed to Inean that the city must,
or the manager of the plant could, fix rates for
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power either on the eitiz~ns or on the eity for
power used by it, on a basis that n1ust produce
sufficient r~Yenue to pay the interest and the
bonds as th~y Inature, r~gardl~:-;s of the amount of
power used or consmned, the ei ty would be made a
guarantor of the bonds, and not 1nerely a guarantor of good faith in operating the plant.· F'or
the city to be a guarantor of the bonds, regardless
of reYenues receiYed, would 1uake the obligation a
debt within the meaning of the Constitution. It ts
the fact that the bonds are only payable from the
revenues of_the utility, and cannot, if any event be
paid from tax revenues, that takes them out of
the debt limitation and upholds the special fund
doctrine.''
In the instant case no election was ever held. No district was created by vote, no bond issue was ever authorized by the electors. X o provision for lien or penalty was
authorized by the electors.

The Commission without passing any resolution or
ordinance had two types of application forms prepared.
One provided for a lien on the property if charges became delinquent. (Exhibit 1) The other, alternative
application (E~it 4), provides that to escape the lien
provision the applicant had to post bond or cash equal
to 18 months advance payment. (Estimated at $54.00
assuming the charges do not increase.) Statements were
made that an ordinance (Exhibit U) under criminal penalty would compel residents to connect up to the sewer.
Reference was then made that the ordinance would provide for a lien in any event. (Exhibit U)

It was stated under the plan if a resident did not sign
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an application form by the 31st day of· July (later by
"gracious fiat" extended to August 31st) it would cost
such resident $100.00 more to then apply for the service.
What choice did a resident have~
Among the essentials of the "special fund" doctrine
is that the people voluntarily subscribe to the project
and voluntarily subscribe to the offered service. In Utah
Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, supra, this Court
speaking through Justice Wolfe said at page 1196 and
1197 of 74 Pac. 2nd:
"* * * we well might have taken such view of
it, for if the framers of the numerous constitutions wherein a debt limit was included had been
asked, 'do you mean this provision to cover a case
where a city or town may be able to provide its
inhabitants with services by the construction of
projects which will not be a charge against taxes
but which may be built entirely by the proceeds
of bonds which provide that their only source
of payment shall be from the revenues of the project~' The answer we may well imagine would be,
'we mean these debt limiting provisions as a protection against burdening the tax-paying inhabitants with too great a load and at the same time
to prevent cities from obligating themselves for
expenditures for any current year beyond the
current revenue which it may reasonably be expected they will during that year obtain, but we
certainly would not want to prevent the people
of any city from obtaining the fruits of community
life by preventing them from enjoying those services which they may obtain by voluntary payments for the services to a project built by monies
loaned by persons willing to look altogether to the
income derived from such services voluntarily
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subscribed for by the inhabitants'." (Italics ours)

J

The plan advanced by the defendants is an attempt
to coerce the residents into doing what the commission
could not do directly.
The defendants' coercive plan reduced to its shortest
form is:
1. You residents have no voice in creating the
district.
You residents are compelled by ordinance to
conneet to the system, with penalty for failure to so connect.
3. You sign an application which will put a lien
on your house for failure to pay ... or keep
18 months' advance payment on desposit at
all tin1es.
4. Sign up by August 31, 1952, or we will assess
you $100.00 penalty ... and force you by ordinance to sign up anyway.
5.

If any charge is unpaid, we will shut off your
culinary water.

What choice, what voluntary action was left to the
residents when the commission presented its scheme
to the residents~
What method could be more arbitrary~ What
scheme could be more coercive~ What plan could be
more capricious~
The residents were denied due process in that the
proposed plan did not attempt to assess the obligation
to pay proportionate to the benefits received.
In the "plan" not only were the requirements of
Section 2 to 6 of Chapter 6a not followed, but the only
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charges made are against those who have homes in the
district and are compelled to connect up to the system.
No charge is made against those owning vacant lots
fronting upon the sewer line, even though such lots may
be greatly benefited and their market value greatly enhanced, the owner of such vacant lot or lots is not required to pay one red cent of the cost. Due process of
law requires the equal sharing of the burden in proportion to the benefit received. The present plan is discriminatory and illegaL
The financial burden for constructing the plan is
placed upon 8600 home owners. The system itself is
designed for a capacity of 40 to 45 thousand homes.
The owners of the vacant property wherein it is thought
that ultimately an additional 30,000 or more homes
will be built are not required to pay lOc in financing
a system from which they will be direct beneficiaries. In
other. words, the plan proposes to saddle upon approximately 191f2% of the total capacity of said sewer system,
the burden of paying for a system designed not only for
themselves, but for the other 80%.
It may be argued that the cost per home owner
will be reduced as the area increases in population. Such
a. theory asks the home owners of the district to assumE
an obligation beyond their capacity to pay on thf
assumption that later others will help them pay. Whethe1
economic conditions will prevail which will continue the
building program that has prevailed in the last six years
is not known.. Whether economic reversals, recessions
or even depression may be our lot in the near future is
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not known. What is known and what would become legally binding upon 8,600 home owners is the obligation to
construct a systen1 designed for 1nore than 40,000 homes
and the requirement of pledging their property for its
paJinent, con1e what 1nay. No satisfactory answer has
been given to this question, and others raised in the
Holladay Petition, by the County Commission.
In Brown Y. City of Denver, 7 Colo. 305, 3 P. 455,
the Oourt said :
"The doctrine of the authorities is that whenever it is sought to deprive a person of his property, or to create a charge against it, preliminary
to, or which may be made the basis of, taking it,
the owner n1ust have notice of the proceeding,
and be afforded ail opportunity to be heard a.s to
the correctness of the assessment or charge. It
matters not what the character of the proceeding
may be, by virtue of which his property is to be
taken-whether administrative, judicial summary,
or otherwise-at some stage of it, and before the
property is taken or the charge becomes absolute
against either the owner or his property, an
opportunity for the correction of wrongs and
errors which may have been committed must be
given. Otherwise the constitutional guaranties
above cited are infringed.
"Learned dissertations upon the meaning of
the phrase, 'due process of law' have been written by judges and lawwriters, but as applicable
to summary proceedings of the character under
consideration, its meaning is comprehended in
the foregoing paragraph. If the law authorizing
the proceedings provides for notice to the owner
of the property to be specified time or place,
before a board or tribunal competent to ad-
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minister proper relief, in order .th~t he may be
heard concerning the correctness of the charge
before it is made conclusive, the constitutional
requirement~ are satisfied. But when the validity
of a law or ordinance is questioned without such
notice or hearing, the objection is not obviated
by proof that a hearing has been had, as a
matter of form, in the case. Nor does it satisfy
the constitutional requirements that the assessment is fair and just. A valid assessment cannot
be made under an invalid law or ordinance, and
its constitutionality is to be tested not by what
has been done under it, but by what it authorizes
to be done by virtue of its provisions."
The Michigan Supreme Court in the case of City
of Port Huron v. Jenkinson, 6 L.R.A. 54 stated:
"No legislative or municipal body has the
power to impose the duty of performing an act
upon any person which it is impossible for him
to perform, and then make his non-performance
of such a duty a crime, for which he may be punished by both fine and imprisonment. It needs
no argument to convince any court or citizen,
where law prevails, that this cannot be done; and
yet such is the effect of the provisions of the
Statute and by-law under consideration."
THE COMMISSION HAS ACTED ARBITRARILY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND UNLAWFULLY.

1. In creating an indebtedness in excess of that

permitted by Article XIV, Section 4, Constitution of Utah.
2. In creating a bond indebtedness in violation ;~
of the procedures required by Title 19, Chapter 10, Section 1, Utah Code. Annotated, 1943. ·. ~·'
We have heretofore set out the argument that Title

i
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19, Chapter 6a· establishes it "'special oommission" in
violation of Article YI, Section 29 and Article XI, Section 5 of the Constitution. Should the Court hold, however, that the act does not create a "special commission",
but authorizes the County Commission to perform a
County function, then said action of the Commission
is invalid as creating a debt in excess of that permitted
by Article XIY, Section 4 of the Constitution and for
incurring a bonded indebtedness in contravention of
Title 19, Chapter 10, Section 1, Utah Code Annotated,
1943.
We have heretofore pointed out that the present
plan does not conform to the. "special fund" doctrine,
since the residents are compelled to accept the offered
service and guarantee payment of the charges, and
thereby guarantee payment of the bonds, by liens against
their property. The lien, in effect, pledges the property
in payment of the .bonds. It is stipulated that the
assessed valuation of the district is 22 million dollars.
Section 4, Article XIV of the Constitution limits the
indebtedness of the County to 2% of the assessed valuation of taxable property. The proposed indebtedness
of 8 million dollars for the sewer system is thus in
excess of such limitation. Further, a bonded indebtedness must be created by election pursuant to Section
19-10-1, Utah Code Anno1tated, 1943. No election has
ever been held as therein required.
Should the Court hold that the district is quasimunicipal, or "an arm of the government" not subject to
the debt limitation of the constitution and the statute,
·41
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the Court should still find the proposed plan as invalid
for failure to follow the statutory provisions under
which the district was created and by which assessments may he made agains1t property under Title 19,
Chapter 6a.
Sections 2 through 6 of Chapter 6a provide the
method for assessment of property to finance the projects permitted therein. Admittedly these methods, procedures and limitations were notfoHowed in the present
plan ..
The only defense the defendants can have is that
assessment is not the method pursued. We contend not
only is it assessment, but assessment to which all who
benefit do not pay equally and in many cases beneficiaries ·are not required to pay aJt all.
The essence of assessment is the levying of a charge
against prop~rty for a benefit inuring to the property
and which assessment becomes a lien against the property.
The plan of defendants is the assessment of a
charge (connection fee and monthly service charge)
agains!t a home owner for a benefit, which charge, if
not paid, becomes a lien against the property.
In the usual assessment payment is made by the
owner and the lien discharged. In the present plan the
lien attaches if payment is not made and is discharged
when paid. In both cases, if payment of the assessment or charge is not paid the property may be sold
to satisfy and discharge the lien. If there is a difference
between these two, we submit it is a difference of form

·~

;~
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and color and not of substance.
The following cases support the proposition that in
order to create a lien the authority of the Legislature
is necessary and the mere regulation by the company
or district is not sufficient:
Turne-r v. Revere 'Yater Co., 171 1\tfass. 329,
50 N.E. 634, 40 L.R.A. 657:
Linne v. Bredes, ±3 'V ashington 540, 86 P. 858,
6L.R.A. (N.S.) 707;
Covington v. Rattern1an, 128 Ky. 336, 108
S."~. 297, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 923.
It is generally held that in construing the legality
of a bond issue the Constitution and Statutes are more
strictly construed when the bonds have not been issued
and sold.
In Stearn v. Fargo (North Dakota), 122 N.W. 403,
26 L.R.A. {N.S.) 665:
"It may be stated as a rule that, in considering the legality of a proposed bond issued by a
City, Courts construe the Constitution and· statutes more strictly than_ they are construed in
determining the validity of bonds already issued
and disposed of. (21 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, pp.
33, 45) ."
The instant case in our opinion is one in which the
"special fund" doctrine has been stretched to the point,
which, if upheld by this Court, would be used as an
artifice to do those things which are forbidden by the
Constitution. This thought has been expressed in the
case of Colorado Central Power Company v. Municipal
Power Development Co., 1 Fed. Supp. 961:
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"The so'"called 'revenue bonds' may be de
scribed as an artifice or scheme to do that which
the Constitution declare·s to be against public
policy and attempts to forbid. It should not
be encouraged."
IF A LEGISLATIVE ACT IS VAGUE, INDEFINITE, UNCERTAIN, AND AMBIGUOUS, IT MAY BE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID. THIS IS AN ADDITIONAL
GROUND WHY THE ENTIRE ACT SHOULD BE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Before a district may be created by a board of
county commissioners with provisions for special improvement district assessments or with provisions of
financing through revenue bonds, "10% of the people
must petition for any such improvement." Section 19
6A-1, U.C.A. 1943. But what is meant by "10% of the
people"? This jurisdictional requirement is vague, indefinite, uncertain, and ambiguous for several reasons.
First, it cannot be determined from the section
whether "10% of the people" means 10% of the people
living in the entire county, or 10% of the people living
in that part of the county outside of the incorporated
cities and towns in such County, or 10% of the people
in the proposed district. Any one interpretation could
be valid depending upon the type of proposed district.
S.econdly, no rule is given as how the 10% is to be
calculated. Certain tests could be used, such as the
latest general census, the number of registered voters,
the number of people owning property. Coupled with
this inadequacy is the uncertainty as to the time of the
count. Thus if a census count gover:ns, the population
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could incr~.ase gr~11tly in ~ pos~i~~~t period of nine years
from the latest general census. During such a ·period,
population could double. On the other hand if the count
is based upon ta...xpa.yers, a more current tabulation
would result in a n1ore accurate count.
Thirdly, countless interpretations have been given
to the word "people." Which one of the following definitions did the legislature mean?
The aggregate or n1ass of the individuals, Solon vs.
State, 11-± S."\V. 349; a political society comprising the
entire population of all ages, sexes, and conditions,
Ex. Rel. Elder vs. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 74 P. 167; persons generally, an indefinite number of men and W?II1en~
folks, population, or part of population, In re Silkman,
8-± N.Y.S. 1025, 88 App. Div. 102; those who by the
existing constitution, are crowned with political rights,
Koehler vs. Hill, 60 Iowa 63, 50 N.W. 609; inhabitants
of State, White vs. Larrimore and W. Irrigation Co.,
1 Colo. App. 480, 29 P. 906; qualified voters, ,State vs.
City of Albuquerque, 31 N.M. 576, 249 P. 242; the free
white male inhabitants, above the age of twenty-one,
State vs. Boyd, 31 Neb. 682,48 N.W. 739.
AJithough by judicial interpretation, it may be determined what the legislature meant by this phrase, we
submit that a jurisdictional requirement such as this
cannot be stated in such general terms. Whether or not
the persons who have allegedly petitioned to create the
district in question qualify under the definition that
might be adopted is highly questionable.
The County Commission adopted as its criterion the
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people living in the district. This interpretation would
establish a criterion in conflict with Section 19-6A-3
which limits the right to protest to persons owning
property in the district.
Section 19-6a-2 to Sections 19-6A-7 inclusive dealing with special assessment districts are rather detailed
and are not subject to the same objections as Sections
19-6a-1 and 19-6a-8.
The latter section we have discussed previously
as to the limited applicability thereof. Unless such an
interpretation is followed we submit that the term
"projects and special improvements as may be appropriate and possible under the laws of the U.S. relating
thereto, as self liquidating projects" is anything but
clear.
The Legislature did not mean the projects and improvements to be those which complied with Federal
laws in the sense that they were not illegal under any
Federal statute. On the other hand if the Legislature
were referring to projects and special improvements
under the R.F.C., Public Works Administration or the
other emergency relief measures, the language used
fails to indicate such a reference.

I

CHAPTER 23 B, LAWS OF UTAH, 1947 (THE "CURATIVE" ACT) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID IN THAT •
IT IS CONTRARY AND REPUGNANT TO THE PROVISIONS 4
OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26 AND OF ARTICLE XI, SECTION 5 OF THE CONSTITUTION AS ATTEMPTING TO J
GRANT UNLAWFUL PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES AND ~
FRANCHISES TO THE SALT LAKE CITY SUBURBAN ~
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SANITARY DISTRICT AND IS A PUBLIC LAW ENACTED
WHERE A GENERAL LAW WOULD BE APPLICABLE.

Later in the brief in our discussion of the resolutions
of the conunission we illustrate that Chapter 23 B is
not prospectiYe in application and does not cure or validate the actions taken by the connnission during 1952.
The present argun1ent is directed only at the unconstitutionality of Chapter 23 B.
Title 19, Chapter 6 a, Section 1 provides the board
of county commissioners of any county may create special in1provement, water supply, sewer or sanitary districts outside of incorporated cities and towns, and flood;
control districts inside or outside of incorporated cities
and towns in such county.
This Section authorizes the creation of several
different types of improvement districts.
Chapter 23 B, Laws of Utah 1947, relied upon as
validating omissions and irregularities in the creation
of the Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary Sewer District,
is a special act attempting to validate irregularities and
omissions in the creation of sanitary districts only.
No attempt is made to validate irregularities or omissions in the creation of any other type of improvement
district.
The only sanitary district ever attempted under
Title 19, Chapter 6 a is, as far as we know, the Salt
Lake City Suburban Sanitary Sewer District.
State ex rel Richards v. Hammer, 42 N.J. Law 435,
Nov. 1880.
,:!(, * * the true principle requires something
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more .than a mere designation by such characteristics as will serve to. classify, for the characteristics which thus serve as the basis of classification must be of such a nature as to mark the
objects so designated as peculiarly requiring exclusive legislation. There must be substantial
distinetion, having a reference to the subject
matter of the proposed legislation, between the
objects or places embraced in such legislation
and the objects or places excluded. The marks
of distinction upon which the classification is
found must be such, in the nature of things, as
.will, in some reasonable degree, at least, account
for or justify the restriction of the legislation.'
Nichols v. Walter, 33 N.W. 800, 802.

"* * * or, to state it differently, though not
so well, the true practical limitation of the legislative power to classify is that the classification
shall be upon some apparent natural reason, some
reason suggested by necessity, by such a difference in the situation and circumstances of the
subjects placed in different classes as suggest
the necessity or propriety of different legislation with respect to them."
In Lyte v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 90
Utah ~69, 61 Pac. 2nd 1259, rehearing denied, 90 Utah
377, 62 Pac. 2nd 1117, the Court had before it an analogous situation.
Section 104-21-31 provided:
"The information or indictment must charge
but one offense, but the same offense may be
set forth in different forms under different
counts ... "
By Section 189 of the Liquor Control Act of 1935,
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the Legislature ·pennitted two offenses .of the Act to be
charged in one complaint. The Court held this provision of the Act to be unconstitutional as special legislation.
In confirming its opinion, the Court on rehearing
said, page 1118, of 62 Pac. 2nd :
~'* • • What apparent natural reason, or
reason suggested by necessity, is there for permitting more than one offense to be charged
against one suspected of having offended against
the Liquor Control Act (Laws 1935, c. 43) that
does not apply to those suspected of having committed some other kind of offenses 1 What necessity or propriety is there in charging two or more
offenses against one who is believed to have
offended against one or more of the provisions
of the Liquor Control Act that' does not equally
apply to those accused of committing offenses
against other acts 1 We are at a loss to find any
substantial reason for making a distinction between the number of charges that may be included in one complaint involving an infraction
of the Liquor Control Act that is not equally
applicable to many, if indeed not all classes of
offenses."
What apparent natural reason, or reasons suggested by necessity, is there for permitting validation
of irregularities and omissions in the. proceedings for
creation of one improvement district, that would not
exist for another1 Should not all, or none of the irreg\'' ularities and omissions in all improvement districts be
validated 1
~. .
The Legislature by limiting its validating act to
49
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,
sanitary districts only and excluding from the validating act, the validation of proceedings of the other districts mentioned in the general law attempted to grant
special immunities, privileges and franchises to the
Salt Lake City Suburban Sewer District, and by such
act enacted special legislation where a general act was
applicable. It is clear that the only purpose of this
act was to validate the irregularities of the sewer district at issue; accordingly, to give any effect to the
Curative Act would be to infringe the constitutional
provision that "corporations for municipal purposes
shall not be created by special laws."
POINT 3. THE COMMISSION'S ACTS ARE ILLEGAL,
ARBITRARY, AND CAPRICIOUS.

It must he recognized that a Board of County Commissioners does not have unlimited powers. If the Commission is acting in a special capacity, such as trustees
of an improvement district, it must follow either the ~~
procedures outlined in the enabling legislative act or if ~
no rules of procedures are outlined, some semblance of
order must be observed. The usual method of carrying
into effect a commission's powers is through resolutions
or ordinances. We shall discuss later what must be
adopted as an ordinance, but at the very least the Commission, as the district's officials, could act only at
legally called meetings and pro,ceed to transact the

I

:!~:: ~: r:::~:~i:::~

with usual procedures by passing

1

An examination of the exhibits will show that until
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April 5, 1948 such a course was followed. On that date
the Commission, having considered the problem for
over a year, faced with overwhelming opposition from
those who were to pay the costs, and unable to construct
because of excessiYe COSts had. the authority and WaS
justified in taking action to abandon the project and
to rescind any formal action previously taken. The fact
that the County Attorney was present at the meeting
and that the rescinding resolution was presented by
his Chief Deputy conclusively proves that the legality
of the action had been duly considered. Even if certain
contracts with third parties had become vested, the
Commission could and did do everything possible to
"kill" the project. In so doing it followed procedures
recognized by authorities.
Thus in the case of Michigan v. Brassman, 11 N.E.
2nd 538, the Supreme Court of Indiana after stating
that vested rights of contract could not be interfered
with by a subsequent rescinding resolution held:
"We do not, however, hold that the original
resolution could not be rescinded by the subsequent resolution in so far as parties who had no
vested rights under the original resolution are
concerned. See Dillon Mun. Corp. Sect. 314 (Sect.
584 in 5th Ed.) and authorities there cited."
This Court in the case of Keigley v. Bench, 63 P.
2nd 262, recognized the validity of the rescinding resolution of Provo City Commission by holding that a
referendum on a resolution that had been rescinded
would be a useless act.
See also State v. Funk (Ore.), 209 P. 113, whe·re it
51
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held cthat SUCh power must be inherent in order to
prevent an imposition ·through fraud, accident or mistake.
To all intents and purposes the district sewer
project remained abandoned for four years. Then the
present Commission was prevailed upon by the fiscal
agent (Ex. 0) to revive it. One of our main criticisms
of the Commission is that action was not taken immediately to dissolve the skeleton district created on September 9, 1946 and abandoned on April 5, 1948 either
by resolution, declaratory judgment, or legislative action. If such action had been taken, a new district could
have been created and the sewer could have been constructed under Chapter 5a of Title 19-the latest legislative procedure. Instead the Commission proceeded
as if the April 5, 1948 resolution had never been adopted
and as if it had full authority and jurisdiction to do
anything the fiscal agent and the engineers recommended.

·Wa.S

During the entire year of 1952 up to October 6,
1952 no formal action of any kind whatsoever was taken ·.
to revive the project. Although the minutes of the Commission during this period show that it did enter certain agreements with the fiscal agents, the engineers,
and the depository, it at no time a-qthorized any Commissioner or anyagent of the Commission to call public
n1eetings, issue literature, and offer agreements. How- ..
ever, the Commission arbitrarily did issue pamphlets
and demanded the people living in the district to sign <
applications under threat of penalties. It was during ·i
this period that defendants' exhibit 1 through 5 were

j
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circulated. Xo formal action approving these exhibits
was taken by the Commission. Inforn1ally, through
newspaper ads. and finally by publication the people
were notified of different deadlines for filing applications. \Y e submit that these so-called applications and
contracts are nullities. ~-\.t this late date it is impossible to learn whether the applications, the contracts
and the contractual provisions contained therein, which
we believe were the handiwork of the fiscal agents, have
been formally approved by the Cmnmission. We are
only certain of the fact that they are an example of a
coercive method promoted by the defendants to secure
applications under threat of penalty and now· have
been approved only in the sense that they are being
used as an argument why the project ~hould proceed.
We repeat, that to date, the Board, either acting as a
Commission or trustees of the district has taken no
formal action either by motion, resolution, or order to
approve or accept these agreements.
We do not deem it necessary that it be determined
at this time whether any contracts or agreements entered
into by the Commission with the fiscal agent, the engi. neer, or other third parties impose any liability on
Salt Lake County or the district. We d~ contend, however, these agreements are without binding effect, having been approved when the district itself was defunct
and abandoned.
That the first resolution adopted by the Cmnmission on October 6, 1952 should be given any effect, is
questionable. Definitely it cannot have any. retroactive
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effect. See Dillon Municipal Corporations, 5th Edition,
Volume 2, page 920:
"A repeal of a repealing ordinance, reviving
the original, does so only from the date of the
reviving ordinance. It has no retroactive effect.
Rutherford v. Swink, 96 Tenn. 564."
The defendant's attempt by resolution to say that
the original resolution of March 18, 1947 has been in
full force and effect is without any significance or legal
justification. An analogy would be if the 1947 legislature had passed an act, the 1949 legislature then specifically re:pealed the act, and thereafter the 1951 legislature attempted to re-enact the act with amendments
and a provision that to all intents and purposes the act
was to have been in full force and effect during the
entire period of the repeal.
A legislature, and we presume, a county commission can under certain circumstances re-enact a law
or revive a resolution but neither a legislature or a
-county commission has the power to turn back the
clock and by edict, declare its enactment has had a four
year retroactive effect.
What purpose did the promoters of the "plan" have
in mind in threatening a $100.00 penalty, when they
knew that no such penalty was then in effect or would
be proposed in the final resolution, except to force,
intimidate, and coerce residents to sign up immediately?

I

Another objection to the $100.00 penalty is the fact
that it is in conflict with the county ordinance duly
adopted May 18, 1942. This ordinance, which was amend-
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ed as recently as ~lay 16, 1951, provides for $150.00
connection fee, which fee n1ust be paid into the general
fund. Either the County must amend this ordinance
and delete this provision, or the connection fee coJlected by the district will not be part of the district's
revenue. The district's ordinances and resolutions have
always declared the connection fee should be payable
only to the district. However, until this general ordinance is repealed, it will take precedence over any socalled agreement or resolution passed by the county
commission in its capacity as district 'trustees. It is
· our position that because the ·ordinance proVided no
penalty and because it was the only law in effect at the
time the applications were distributed and demanded,
any fee or penalty in conflict with the May .18, 1942
orqinance was illegal.
If we assume that the resolution of April 5, 1948
was not effective (a concession which we are not willing
to make), the only authority under which agreements
could be submitted for sewer connections and under
which penalties could be imposed was the resolution of
March 7, 1947. But the defendants did not purport to
be acting under the authority of the provisions of this
resolution; to the contrary the connection fee and the
penalties conflict with the provisions of this resolution.
See page 29 (Ex. U) which sets up an initial service
charge of $50.00 payable in advance, plus an additional
payment of $99.00 in cash or $120.00 payable in four
I! installments; if applications are filed after the letting
, of the construction contract, the additional charge is
1
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increased from $99.00 (cash) ·or· $120.00 (credit) to
$140.00 in cash at $41.00 (cash) or $20.00 (credit). The
delinquent date was the prior to letting of the first construCJtion contract, not some arbitrary date.
Not only do the provisions of the agreement for the
connection fee and the penalty conflict with both the
ordinance of May 18, 1942 and the abandoned resolution of March 17, 1947 but they do not conform to the
applicable provisions of the master resolution adopted
October 6, 1952. The penalty in this resolution is fixed
in the amount of $50.00 or 33113% of the connection fee.
The penalty does not become effective if the "agreement
is executed prior to the letting of the first construction
contract." Arbitrarily the first penalty date had been
set at July 31, 1952. Thereafter it was moved up to
August 31, 1952 and subsequently in regard to a favored
few it was moved up to September 20, 1952.
Defendants' answer alleges "that numerous mass
meetings wre held concerning financial plans proposed
by the county."
~
As we have previously cited this Court has emphasized that voluntary participation is a feature of the
Special Fund Doctrine. We have argued that the act
under which the defendants have proceeded is unconstitutional because it deprives the people of their rights.
An unconstitutional inadequacy of the act cannot be
remedied by gratuitous concessions of the defendants,
such as holding mass meetings and accepting protests.
Even these gestures were meaningless. To merely hold
mass meetings and explain the plan is hardly due pro-

1

1
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cess: The inadequacy of the procedure was emphasized
if one attended such a meeting. It is true that the
general plan· was outlined, yet the representatives of
· the defendants could not and did not refer to any single
order resolution or ordinance to substantiate their
'
'
representations
because
no resolution was in effect at
the time the meetings were held. No proposed ordinance
or resolution was available for study. It was not until
October 6, 1952 when the resolutions were finally adopted that the people had anything. concrete to protest.
The project and the method of financing of March· 17,
1947 had been rescinded and abandoned so it would
have been useless to protest the provisions of this- resolution. What protests were filed, such as the protest
of the Holladay Group, incorporated as part of the defendants' answer, could only object to a nebulous pro. .
posal which admittedly was subject to changes and
amendments. At this time the proposed resolution or
ordinance was not made available to the public for inspection; no engineering plan or report was on file and
the plans and specifications themselves had not been
completed.
The hearing on August 25 (Ex. R) recognizes that
the protests were i:ri regard to an "outline'' of a sewer
plan. At said hearing the fiscal agents and the defend-·
ants admitted that as of that date the total amount of
f the bond issue had not been determined, the maturity
dates had not been decided upon, and argued that the
objections to tentative plans were .without foundation

1
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because it was possible that the final plan would be
changed.
Finally, the objections which were raised at the
mass meetings, those filed by the Holladay Group and
those expressed at the hearings were merely taken under
advisement. No provision was made for applying under
protest, yet as is admitted in defendants' answer, "in
excess of 390 individuals" signed under protest and the
• Holladay protest contained 2645 signatures. Thus in
spite of the fact that 44% of the owners of existing
structures filing applications signified they protested
the plan, no formal ruling was rendered on the filed
protests and no announcements or rulings were made .
after the public hearing. Instead without advance notice '
the defendants' plan was hurriedly adopted on October
6, 1952. All of the objections previously raised in the
Holladay petition and all of the arguments advanced
at the public hearing were ignored, thereby nullifying
the democratic expressions of the very people who will
be forced to pay the costs.
Again we cite the illegality of imposing upon 8600
property owners the financial burden of paying for a .
system designed for 45,000 connections (Holladay prO>test). We submit that it is arbitrary and capricious
to compel under threats of criminal and financial penalty
a person, such as a veteran, struggling to meet t~e ~ayments on his purchase money mortgage on h1s httle
home, to agree to pay upwards of $1,200.00 for the
sewer and at the same time permit an owner of vast,
unimproved acreage to pay nothing, if he chooses, for~
1

1

1
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the enhancement in value to his property by the improvements financed by others.
POINT 4. THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED OCTOBER 6,
1952 ARE ILLEGAL, VOID, AND BEYOND THE POWER OF
THE COnil\HSSION.

\Ye shall now turn to the resolutions of October 6,

i952.
\Ve have previously analyzed the resolution of April
5, 1948 (Ex. L) and we respectfully ask the Court to
read this resolution should there by any doubt whether
the 1948 Commission was advised as is denied by the
first resolution (Ex. Y). \Ve have disputed the power
to amend a resolution after it has been legally rescinded.
We do not claim that the Commission could not have
passed a resolution on October 6 which incorporated
all of the sections of the March 18, 1947 resolution but
we do claim that the Commission could not do this
indirectly for the sole purpose of taking advantage of
the so-called Curative Act of 1947.
There might be some justification for the amend, ment of the original resolution if it were determined
soon after the adoption thereof that certain details of a
resolution could be improved by amendments. However,
it must be recognized that there was a span of 6 years
~ between the date of the original creation of the district
i and more than 5.:lj2 years between the date of the orig1· inal bonding resolution and the amending resolutions,
and that more than four years had passed from the
date of the abandonment of the project.
If the district had proceeded as originally planned
-
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and changes in detail had been .required., an amendment
would be in order. However, the facts were, that r..,egardless of the rescinding and abandoning resolution,
all parties interested considered the project dead. Vested rights, if any, of third parties had expired. There
was no justification or valid reason to adopt this first
resolution.
It is apparent that the defendants are attempting
tQ claim the benefits of Chapter 23B Laws of Utah 1947,
the Curative Act. Even assuming, arguendo that the
March 17, 1947 resolution could be revived, the amending
resolution of October 6, 1952 and the third resolution
do not come within the validating provisions of this act.
The act was meant to correct any errors and irregularities. It was not intended by the legislature to validate
any subsequent ordinances or resolutions. The only
authority given the board under the act is, "to proceed
with the issuance of the bonds thereunder and to make
such changes in the details of said bonds as it may find
necessary." An analysis of the original resolution as
purportedly amended by Ex. W, called the Master Resolution, and implemented by Ex. X, the resolution providing for the issuance of an additional $3,850,000 bonds,
clearly demonstrates that the defendants are not merely
making changes in the details but are attempting to
push through an entirely new project.
I
The following are some of the amendments the defendants have assumed are "changes in details":
~
COST-The estimate has now been increased from

$2,750,000.00 to $8,000,000.00.

r~
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AUTHORIZED ISSUE-Authorized revenue bonds
has been increased fron1 $2,750,000.00 to $6,600,000.00.
PREJIIUJI-Premiums have been changed from
$10.00 per bond redeemed in 1958 up to $20.00 for each
bond redeemed after 1961 to $50.00 if redeemed prior
to 1957 and $20.00 if redeemed after 1972.
JIATURITIES-Originally the bonds became due
$50,000.00 per annmu over a 28 y~ar period beginning
1950 and ending 1977; under the amendments $50,000.00
in bonds are due in the vears 1955 and 1956; $100,000.00
is due per annmn for the next 22 years ; $200,000.00 is
due in 1980 and 1981; $300,000.00 per annum is due for
the next five years-1982-1986; $600,000.00 ·is due in
1987. Maturity dates are provided for only $4,600,000.00
in bonds; therefore, $2,000,000.00 of the authorized issue
must hereafter be given maturity dates.
CALLABLE RIGHTS-Originally, bonds were callable for redemption during the first 9% years without
premium. This right was cancelled.
IMMEDIATE SALE-The original resolution provided for immediate sale of $1,400,000.00 in bonds. The
amending resolution provides for immediate sale of
$4,600,000.00 in bonds.
EXCESS AUTHORIZATION'-The amount authorized in excess of the amount proposed to be issue~ has
been changed fron1 $1,350,000.00 to $2,000,000.00.
METHOD OF SALE-Originally, the resolution
provided for an absolute sale to Lorrin W. Gibbs at a
maximtun fixed interest cost of 31;4% ; the amendment
provides for a sale "in such manner and on such terms
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as may be provided or approved by the Board of County
Commissioners." There is no limitation on the maximum
interest and the bonds can be sold below par.
(IT WAS THIS LATTER CHANGE AND THE
FUTURE ACTION THAT MIGHT RESULT THAT
WAS ONE OF· THE MAIN CAUSES FOR THE SALT
LAKE COUNTY IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION
TO BE ORGANIZED AND TO APPEAR IN THIS
CASE. WE DO NOT CLAIM THAT THE DEFENDANTS DELIBERATELY GAVE THEMSELVES
THIS UNLIMITED POWER. THE FACT REMAINS,
HOWEVER, THAT THE FISCAL AGENTS, OBLIGATED TO FIND A BUYER AND PERMITTED
TO BUY THE BOND THEMSELVES, COULD
LEGALLY PURCHASE THE BONDS AT A PRICE
WITH SUCH INTEREST RATE AS WOULD BE
VERY DETRIMENTAL TO THE PROPERTY OWNERS OF THE DISTRICT. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE
BONDS ARE ADVERTISED FOR PUBLIC SALE
AND NO BIDS ARE RECEIVED THE FISCAL
AGENTS COULD OFFER TO BUY THE BONDS
"AT A PRICE, INTEREST RATE, AND MATURITIES" FIXED BY THEM. THE ONLY CONDITION ACCORDING TO THE CONTRACT IS THAT
THE PRICE, INTEREST RATE, AND MATURITIES .
MUST BE APPROVED AS TO LEGALITY BY THE
FISCAL AGENT'S BOND ATTORNEY AND BY
THE ENGINEERS AS TO FEASIBILITY. UNDER
THIS CONTEACT (EX. 0) THE SALT LAKE
COUNTY COMMISSION HAS NO RIGHT TO REFUSE SUCH A BID).
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We have objected strenuously to the affirmative
acts of the defendants which were adopted without legal
justification. "~ e now must point out in which particulars the defendants haYe failed to act, and because
of such failure, their resolutions are invalid.
'V e respectfully refer the Court to the three resolutions (Exhibits F, ,Y, and X). An attempt to arrive
at a coherent analysis of them confuses even experts.
Instead of one detailed resolution the reader must start
with an outmoded plan, which is then altered piecemeal
by another resolution, and further supplemented by a
fragmentary addendum. The result is sixty-three pages
of inconsistencies, a patch-work conglomeration, which
a project of this magnitude does not deserve. If we
compare the result with what authorities recommend,
we are appalled. The reasons clarity is essential was
stated in the case of Miller et al. v. State, 83 Ga. App.
135, 62 S.E. 2nd 921 :
"Such a resolution must reasonably show the
nature, kind and location and such other facts as
will with reasonable fullness and definiteness
describe and define the undertaking including
the estimated costs thereof. Another reason why
these facts should appear in the resolution is that
the citizens of the municipality have the right to
object to the validation of the certificates on the
grounds that the project is unreasonable or unsound and possibly others.·
"The approximate fixing of the costs is as
vital a part of the resolution as the authorization
of the certificates.
"While no tax can be levied to pay for such
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·, ~: . . -:.:.:. ~n irp.pr:ovemeJJ:J · to be financed by revenue cer.
tificates, the fixing of water and sewerage charges
amounts in most ways to the same thing. A
· water user has· as much interest ill his water
rate as he has in the proposed assessment or tax
for an improvement affecting him by additional
assessments.
"Unless a reasonable degree of definiteness
is required in the ordinance, the door is left wide
open for one of two undesirable consequences
one is that a project may be carried out sub~
stantially different from the one or more fixed
or alternative plans or parts of plans originally
contemplated, or the selection of the project may
be delated to an inferior authority contrary to
law."
Our Commission could not be more definite because
the. engineers had not prior to the resolution submitted
for their study an engineering feasibility report. (See
stipulation dated November 13, 1952). It is no wonder,
therefore, that in Section II (unamended) of Ex. U
they have pro:vided; "The cost of the portion of the
system which is to be- initially constructed, including
all incidental expenses hereafter specified, is estimated
to be not in excess of $2,750,000.00," yet suddenly, on
page 27, Ex. X, the. total estimated cost is hiked to
$8,000,000.00. While this may. be a nice round figure· it~
does not come within one and half niillion dollars of the
estimate advanced by the engineers and represented as
1
the cost by defendants at the mass meetings (Stipula-,
tion dated November 12, 1952). We wouldn't want to l
accuse. the Con1mission of plann.0g to spend the differ-OJ

64
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ence between $6,111,076 and $8,000,000, or $1,888,924
on the fiscal agents' fees, attorneys' fees, and interest
during construction. VVe, therefore, can only conclude
that an arbitrary figure has been selected in order to
give them unlimited leeway.
Our Legislature has required that an engineer's
report be submitted as to feasibility before bonds may
be issued by municipalities. See Sections 15-7-40 and
100-10-.f U.C.A. 1943. Under sections 19-6A-8 revenue
' be issued to finance "the proposed project
bonds may
or special improvement." We submit this power should
be construed strictly and that the Commission's authority
to issue bonds should be limited to the actual cost of
the project, and the total authorization should not exceed a sum equal to the engineers' estimate less the
estimated initial payments. Such a strict construction
is called for in passing on bond laws in connection with
proposed issues not yet in the hands of third parties.
See Stearn v. Fargo, supra, page 43 ..
Evidently defendants recognized that they were
authorizing an issue of $2,000,000.00 in excess of what
was needed because the right to determine maturities
and optional features is res~rved This proviso in and
of itself renders the remainder of the resolutions meaningless. How can a prospective buyer of the bonds with
fixed maturities and options be certain that the Commission will not after he has bid, offer for sale $2,000,000.00 of bonds falling due prior to those he is about
to purchase 1 In effect this is the same as mortgaging
property and reserving the right to place a later mort-
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gage of equal parity with another mortgagee, but the
latter mortgage will become due earlier. Such a mortgage would demand a high rate of interest or an excessive '·premium. Likewise reserving the unlimited right
to issue $2,000,000.00 excessive bonds, no matter how
the funds are to he used, cheapens the value of those
first issued and will only result in ultimately the public
paying exorbitant interest costs and premiums.
Every principle of due process was violated by the
defendants by the manner in which they adopted the
resolutions on October 6, 1952. Basically instead of pro·ceeding by resolution, an all-inclusive ordinance should
'have been adopted. The action taken that date was, in
our opinion, the most important legislative enactment
ever attempted by any Board of Salt Lake County
Commissioners. Therefore the pronouncement of this
Supreme Court in the case of Keigley v. Bench, supra, •
is significant :
"Of course, accurately speaking, an ordinance
is the proper designation for legislative action."

1

We respectfully submit that this Honorable Court
implement this recent opinion by adopting the views •
I
of the Supreme Court of Arkansas which decided in the 1
case of Van Hovenberg v. Holeman, 201 Ark. 370, 144
S.W. 2nd 718 that a "resolution" or "order" is not
law, but merely the form in which the legislative body.
expresses an opinion, and an "ordinance" prescribes
a permanent rule of conduct or government, while a
"resolution" is of a special and temporary character.
Acts of legislation by a municipal corporation which

a:

A
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are to have continuing force and effect must be embodied in "ordinances" while Inere n1inisterial arts may
be in the form of "resolution" and where character
requires an act to be done by ordinances, or where such
a require1nent is in1plied by necessary inference, a
resolution is not sufficient, but an ordinance is necessary.
\Ye admit our error in our petition in erroneously
denominating the bond "'resolutions" of .Nfarch 17, 194 7
and October 6, 193:2 as "ordinancs." At all mass meetings and in all correspondence of the defendants it was
stated that an "ordinance" would be eventually passed.
We still believe that although the commission has designated these enactments "resolutions," they are in fact
ordinances. As such they should have been adopted in
accordance with the provisions of Section 19-11-1, U.C.A.,
1943. Apparently the only reason they were not adopted
as ordinances was that they would not have to be published and so that they could be ordered to take effect
immediately. This section has no emergency provision,
similar to the clause in Section 15-6-12, U.C.A., 1943,
applicable to municipalities~
The basis for this right of publication and the
· limitations on the use of emergency enacting clauses
has been the subject of many texts and decisions.
~IcQuillan on Municipal Ordinances states:
''The provision is in the nature of a limitation upon the legislative and ministerial power.
It is intended to enable the public to acquire
knowledge of the ordinance before it shall become
operative for any purpose. Where persons are
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... '

made.:liable, to. penal conse.quences·it is a hardship
.jf they .are not seasonably informed." -(Page 46).
"Due notice of contemplated action upon the
part of the municipal authorities is a wise and
salutary rule, and is rigidly enforced by the
courts as a fundamental constitutional right. Provisions respecting publication and sufficient notice
are generally held mandatory, and hence failure
to publish in substantially the manner prescribed
renders the ordinance or resolution void." (Page
248).
"The people are to be informed of the regulations which are to govern them, and time as
well as publication is material. The legislature
wisely put stress both upon the mode of promulgation and upon the length of time to be allowed,
and it would be wrong to abridge this time by
construction." (Page 46) .

In a recent case, Bonnie v. Smith, 147 P. 2nd 777,
·the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled on this issue in
connection with an ordinance establishing a sewer district. There too the ordinance. contained an emergency
clause and was not published. The court ruled that the
ordinance was void and that the town was without
jurisdiction to proceed :
"Since the creation of these districts and the
apportionment of the cost thereof to the properties affected is not an inherent power that can be
exercised by municipalities in the absence of statutory grants of such power must be explicit and .
must be strictly construed, and must be strictly
applied against the exercise of the power in any
manner save in the 1nost literal sense within the
meaning of the language of the statutes, American-First Nat. Bank v. Peterson, 169 Okl. 588,
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38 P. 2d 957, we ·cannot overlook the failure to
publish this ordinance on the theory it was an
en1ergency ordinance."
·

Also the Supreme Court of Washington has frowned
upon this unauthorized procedure in the case of Robb
v. Tacoma, :2S P. (2nd) 327:
"There is quite a difference between the issuance and enforcement of orders, generally, to
abate a nuisance or to prevent the spread of a
threatened epidenric, on the one hand, and on the
other, an order compelling a city to install a
Yast sewage system necessitating a bonded indebtedness of $3,000,000 .
.. Furthern1ore, we do not think that an emergency, as contemplated by the statute and our
decisions, is presented by the pleading in this
case. The condition complained of did not suddenly appear, but had been a recurring topic of
discussion for a long time, as appears by the
answer."
The defendants' surreptitious enactment of these
resolutions without publication was a delibe-rate attempt
to circumvent limitations and restrictions imposed by
the Legislature "for the purpose of protecting the community, the -people, from hasty, ill-conceived, fraudulent,
or questionable ventures of officials serving short terms
and who Inay wish to put over some pet scheme or "child"
of their own. On important n1atters the people must not
be left unadvised or their will ignored."
Justice Larson in Utah Power & Light Co. v. Provo,
74 P. 2nd 1191.

69
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
We have gone to some lengths to convince the Court
that construction and financing of a sewer system should
not proceed under the present plan.
We submit that there is justification for holding
either that the Commission adopted the wrong statute,
or that the statute adopted is unconstitutional, or that
the defendants acted illegally, arbitrarily, and capriciously, or that the bonding resolutions are illegal, void,
and beyond the defendants' power.
Accordingly, this court should enter a permanent
writ of prohibition enjoining the Board of Salt Lake
County Commissioners from the proceeding to acquire
a sanitary sewer system under the name of Salt Lake
City Suburban Sewer District.
Respectfully submitted,

ALVIN I. SMITH
HERBERT F. SMART
Attorneys for
SALT LAKE CouNTY SuBURBAN
IMPROVEMENT AssociATION
Involwntary Party Plaintiff
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